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Abstract
We consider a competitive extraction industry comprising many small
￿rms, each with a slightly di⁄erent quality of mineral holdings. With
"rapidly" declining quality of holding per ￿rm we observe rent declining
over and interval. We do not work with the planning solution, commonly
invoked in the study of ￿rms with distinct qualities of stock.
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1 Introduction
An issue of long-standing in oil-extraction economics is extending the Hotelling
[1931] case of the competitive industry with identical small ￿rms to one with
small ￿rms with distinct qualities of respective small holdings of stock. The
classic contribution is Levhari and Leviatan [1977] and a recent investigation is
Livernois and Martin [2001]. Here we draw back from the matter of formulating
the problem as one in dynamic optimization at the industry level and focus
instead on the local-in-time arbitrage condition for a single competitive extrac-
tive ￿rm, a ￿rm in a competitive industry. We then move up from zero pro￿t
arbitrage for a competitive ￿rm to the long run equilibrium for the extractive
industry, the collectivity comprising many ￿rms each with its very small holding
of stock with a distinct quality (and in consequence with a distinct extraction
cost). As time passes, we observe market rent rising at a rate less than the rate
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1of interest. A special case of our illustrative example is the classic Hotelling
outcome, market rent rising at r%: This corresponds to each ￿rm having the
same quality of stock.
With quality declining quite rapidly, we observe that market rent declines
over time, an outcome ruled out in the analysis of Livernois and Martin [2001].
Livernois and Martin follow tradition and work with an INDUSTRY extraction
cost function and a PLANNER maximizing discounted surpluses. They sidestep
the issue of de￿ning ￿rms in their analysis. We break with tradition and focus
￿rst on an extractive ￿rm with zero pro￿t from intertemporal arbitrage and then
"work up" to the industry "equilibrium" at each moment. The marginal ￿rm
at each date in our analysis is indi⁄erent between extracting its small holding
of the stock currently or a moment later. In our view to extend Hotelling [1931]
to the case of heterogeneous stock, one must not only focus on the competitive
￿rm, ￿rst o⁄, but one must also pay close attention to the implicit model of
the "geology" of the stock that one is working with. Our formulation makes
sense when total stock is located in a very long and thin pipe extending down
into the earth￿ s crust. The stock may be of uniform intrinsic quality but each
unit is more costly to extract as one moves deeper into the stock. We associate
a competitive ￿rm with the holding of one unit of the stock. As time passes,
￿rms located further down in the pipe extract their units and place them on the
market.
We are dealing with a concept of industry equilibrium, one built up directly
from extractive frims, di⁄erent from that in Livernois and Martin and many
other contributors. Hence when our result contradicts the central result of
Livernois and Martin we are not indicating that the details of their analysis
are faulty, rather we suggest that the concept of industry equilibrium which
they work with, one "embedded in" a planning framework, may not be good
at capturing the problem of extraction with many competitive ￿rms, each with
a distinct small holding of the total stock. We return to the matter of the
appropriate model below.
2Figure 1: Q(t) in period t and Q(t + 1) in period t+1, with the marginal ￿rm
in period t being the intra marginal ￿rm in period t+1. For the marginal ￿rm
to be indi⁄erent between extracting between periods, its pro￿t on its ton must
di⁄er between periods by r%: Hence p(t + 1) ￿ C(Q(t);S(t)) = (1 + r)[p(t) ￿
C(Q(t);S(t))]:
2 The Analysis
We focus ￿rst on the condition for zero pro￿t arbitrage for the marginal ￿rm
in period t. Our set up involves each ￿rm with a distinct extraction cost and
each ￿rm owning a very small amount of oil, say 1 ton for concreteness. In our
industry equilibrium there will be Q(t) ￿rms extracting at date t and the mar-
ginal ￿rm, will have extraction costs for its ton as C(Q(t);S(t)): Each other ￿rm
extracting at date t will have extraction costs lower than C(Q(t);S(t)): Hence
the marginal ￿rm will earn a "Hotelling" rent on its unit extracted whereas
each intramarginal ￿rm which is active at the same instant will earn the same
"Hotelling" rent plus some "quality" (Ricardian) rent. In Figure 1 we illustrate
extraction of Q(t) ￿rms at date t and Q(t + 1) ￿rms t+1 in a discrete time
"approximation".
In Figure 1, we have the arbitrage condition for the marginal ￿rm in period
3t, in
p(t + 1) ￿ C(Q(t);S(t)) = (1 + r)[p(t) ￿ C(Q(t);S(t))]:
In continuous time this condition is taken as
_ p(t) = [p(t) ￿ C(Q(t);S(t))]r:
We turn to an example in order to illustrate industry equilibrium and rent
declining over time. We take C(Q(t);S(t)) as [S0 ￿ S(t) + Q(t)]D for D a
positive constant and S0 the initial stock in the deposit being ￿ shared by￿the
S0 ￿rms. We assume that the market (industry) demand schedule is linear as
in p(t) = A ￿ BQ(t) for A and B positive constants. (For the special case of
D = 0 we have Hotelling￿ s original competitive industry with his linear demand
schedule.) Then industry equilibrium involves solving
￿B _ Q(t) = [A ￿ BQ(t) ￿ [S0 ￿ S(t) + Q(t)]D]r
and _ S(t) = ￿Q(t):
Note that the ￿rst equation above indicates that ￿ _ Q(t) is proportional to current
rent, the factor of proportionality being r=B: Thus if rent is declining, ￿ _ Q(t)
will be declining. In textbook renderings of Hotelling￿ s competitive industry
model, ￿ _ Q(t) is usually indicated to be increasing with time and we observe
this behavior for the case of D near zero. The ￿ geology￿of this example was
sketched in the introduction. One thinks of S0 ￿rms each owning one unit of
homogeneous stock, with each unit stacked on others as with a straight pipe
moving down toward the center of the earth. The pipe would have depth S0:
￿ Early￿￿rms face lower extraction costs because their holding is less deep than
￿ later￿￿rms. The cost of extraction per ￿rm increases in a linear fashion as
￿ the process￿moves deeper as time passes.




+ a1 _ S + a2S = R0: (1)












r: A ￿ S0D is rent cor-
responding to Q(T) = 0 and S(T) = 0 and must be non-negative. We turn
to solve equation (1) in S. Note that the limits of the model require that the
4values of parameters A;S0;D and r are such that R0 > 0: Otherwise, for R0 = 0
we have trivial solution S(t) ￿ 0 and for R0 < 0 we have negative S(t) for all
t 2 (0;T):
In the simplest case, the boundary conditions will be S(T) = 0 and _ S(T) =
￿Q(T) = 0: Hence the solution involves obtaining the Q(0) which results in the
boundary condition being satis￿ed at end date T:1 In our case the solution of
(1) is
S(t) = C1e￿1t + C2e￿2t + F
because the determinant of the characteristic equation ￿ = a2
1 ￿ 4a2 for the
corresponding homogeneous equation is always positive in our problem. We
have ￿1 = (￿a1 +
p
￿)=2 and ￿2 = (￿a1 ￿
p
￿)=2 - the roots of the char-
acteristic equation and F = R0=a2 is a particular solution of the nonhomo-
geneous equation (1). Using terminal condition _ S(T) = 0 we have C1 =
￿C2￿2eT(￿2￿￿1)=￿1: Substituting it into (1) and using the initial condition













Then we can use the second terminal condition S(T) = 0 in order to de￿ne T :












which after transformations can be written as follows




where R1 = (1 ￿ a2S0=R0)(1 ￿ ￿2=￿1): Nonlinear equation (2) in T has a
unique positive solution (Fig. 2) because ￿2 < 0;a2 < 0 which follows R1 > 1:
This implies that we have in the left hand side an exponentially increasing func-
tion starting from unity and in the right hand side an increasing function starting
from the value which is greater than unity but less than R1 and asymptotically
approaching R1:
1A more complicated case will have price rise relatively rapidly and some high cost ￿rms
will choose not to extract because their pro￿t would be negative.
5Figure 2: Solution of equation in T.
Figure 3: Acceleration of extraction ￿ _ Q(t) for D = 0:1 (solid line), D = 0:15
(dotted line), and D = 0:25 (in circles).
We report on numerical example with r = 0:1;A = 50; and B = 0:9 that
growth in D follows the inverted hump-shaped accelerations ￿ _ Q(t) (Fig. 3)2.
This indeed implies the decreasing pattern of rent in a neighborhood of initial
point t = 0 for D = 0:25 (Fig. 4).
The corresponding behavior of extraction Q(t) and price p(t) are depicted
on ￿gures 5 and 6.
2For the values of D = 0:1; D = 0:15; and D = 0:25 equation (2) implies T0:1 = 7:45;
T0:15 = 7:94; and T0:25 = 9:28:
6Figure 4: Rent function for D = 0:1 (solid line), D = 0:15 (dotted line), and
D = 0:25 (in circles).
Figure 5: Extractions.
Figure 6: Price.
73 Planning Solution versus Market Solution
The textbook planning solution (Levhari and Leviatan [1975] and Livernois and
Martin [2001]) works with an extraction cost function de￿ned on current in-
dustry output. The planner has of course perfect foresight and is able to vary
current industry output in order to "smooth" extraction costs over periods by
varying industry output across periods with a view to maximizing the present
value of surpluses. In a sense such planning solutions involve both meeting
current demands for extracted output and arranging outputs across periods
in such a way that aggregate costs are "minimized" over many periods. Our
market solution involves no such long run "optimization" of extraction costs.
Our marginal ￿rm at any date simply responds to zero pro￿t arbitrage across
"periods" and industry costs evolve without the guidance of a planner. Our
"decentralized" solution and the planning solution that is well-known are in-
herently di⁄erent formulations of the problem of extraction with steadily rising
unit extraction costs. That the planning solution was di¢ cult to represent as a
decentralized solution was pointed out by Cummings [1969]. We have not seen
what might be referred to as "the Cummings problem" with a heterogeneous
stock addressed by the contributors in the Levhari-Leviatan tradition. We are
not proposing a general treatment of the Cummings problem. Rather we set
out a plausible market outcome in an example with heterogeneous stock and
observe that rising rent is not the inevitable outcome.
4 Concluding Remark
We have constructed an example of extraction by many ￿rms with a small
holding of oil, each holding distinct, which has Hotelling [1931] as a special
case. The solved example fails to exhibit steadily increasing rent over time, the
outcome that Livernois and Martin [2001] established as the inevitable outcome
in their model, a model in the tradition of Levhari and Leviatan [1977]. Our aim
is to establish that in a plausible model of competitive extraction, heterogeneity
of stock can lead in an unforced way to periods of declining rent. This we contend
is a natural property of an extended Hotelling model, one that a person might
well observe in the data on extraction. We contend that the heterogeneous stock
8models in the Levhari-Leviatan tradition possess the problem of being di¢ cult
to translate into market outcomes with many competitive extractive ￿rms (a
version of what we refer to as the Cummings problem). Hence our approach
above, perhaps imperfect, based on the marginal extractive ￿rm at each date
rather than on the industry at each date.
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